A10: Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
Axx: Unsolicited Framing

A10: Unvalidated Redirects

- **Web application redirects are very common**
  - Redirect request to a URL-supplied destination
    - User accesses page requiring auth
    - Redirected to login page with URL of origin page as parameter
    - After login, redirected back to URL of origin page



    - What if someone screen-scraped Yahoo, found an unvalidated redirect on one of its properties, and phished you with this link in a page/email?

`https://r.yahoo.com/?.src=ym&.intl=us&.lang=en-US&.done=https%3a//login.yahoo.com.cxx`

A10: Unvalidated Redirects

- **If not validated, request bounces off of a site that is legitimate and sends victim to a site run by the adversary for phishing or automated malware download**
  - Victim sees something that has the right domain, ends up at a site that looks like it (but controlled by adversary)
  - Podesta perhaps?
- **What attack in the last lecture is this similar to?**

Unvalidated Redirect Illustrated

1 **Attacker sends attack to victim via email or webpage**

From: Internal Revenue Service
Subject: Your Unclaimed Tax Refund
Our records show you have an unclaimed federal tax refund.
Please click here to initiate your claim.

https://www.irs.gov/taxrefund/claim.jsp?year=2006& … &dest=www.evilsite.com

2 **Victim clicks link containing unvalidated parameter**



Request sent to vulnerable site, including attacker's destination site as parameter. Redirect sends victim to attacker site

3 **Application redirects victim to attacker's site**



4 **Evil site installs malware on victim, or phish's for private information**

A10: Unvalidated Redirects

- Java

```
response.sendRedirect(request.getParameter("url"));
```

- PHP

```
$redirect_url = $_GET['url'];
header("Location: " . $redirect_url);
```

.NET redirect example

```
public ActionResult LogOn(LogOnModel model, string returnUrl) {
   if (ModelState.IsValid) {
      if (MembershipService.ValidateUser(model.UserName, model.Password)) {
         FormsService.SignIn(model.UserName, model.RememberMe);
         if (!String.IsNullOrEmpty(returnUrl)) {
            return Redirect(returnUrl);
         }
         else {
            return RedirectToAction("Index", "Home");
         }
      }
      else {
         ModelState.AddModelError("", "Incorrect user name or password.");
      }
  } // If we got this far, something failed, redisplay form
  return View(model);
}
```

A10: Unvalidated Forwards

- **Forwards similar to redirects, but remain in same web application**
  - Transfer in .NET
  - Internally send the request to a new page in the same application
    - If access to target page not validated, attacker may be able to use unvalidated forward to bypass authentication or authorization checks

Unvalidated Forward Illustrated

1 **Attacker sees link in vulnerable, but accessible page that calls the forward**

Forwarding code assumes "dest" set via page and has no malicious values



2 **Application authorizes request, which continues to the forward**

Filter

```
public void doPost( HttpServletRequest request,
HttpServletResponse response) {
    try {
        String target = request.getParameter( "dest" ) );
        ...
        request.getRequestDispatcher( target
        ).forward(request, response);
    }
    catch ( ...
```

```
public void sensitiveMethod(
HttpServletRequest request,
HttpServletResponse response) {
    try {
          // Do sensitive stuff here.
          ...
    }
    catch ( ...
```

3 **Forwarding pathway fails to validate destination page. Attacker sets target to a page of his/her choosing (potentially an unauthorized page), bypassing access control**

JSP forward example

- **Redirect within site via internal fwd parameter**

```
public class ForwardServlet extends HttpServlet
{
  protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
                  throws ServletException, IOException {
    String query = request.getQueryString();
    if (query.contains("fwd"))
    {
      String fwd = request.getParameter("fwd");
      try
      {
        request.getRequestDispatcher(fwd).forward(request, response);
      }
      catch (ServletException e)
      {
        e.printStackTrace();
      }
    }
  }
}
```

A10 – Prevention

- **Avoid using redirects and forwards**
  - If used, don't include user input in defining the target URL
  - If you 'must' include user input, then, validate each parameter to ensure its valid and authorized access
- **Whitelist redirect locations to ensure it goes to an authorized external site**
- **Force redirects first to a page notifying user of redirect and have them click to confirm**
- **Authorize via access controller before forwarding**
  - Ensure all users who can access the original page are ALL authorized to access the target page when used

OWASP resources

- **OWASP's Guide to Building Secure Web Applications**
  - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Guide
- **Cheat sheets**
  - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cheat_Sheets
- **Application Security Verification Standard**
  - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ASVS
- **OWASP's ESAPI tools**
  - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI

Axx: Unsolicited Framing, UI Redress (Clickjacking)

- **Users visit a malicious website**
  - Malicious site contains an `<iframe>` that loads a legitimate site in a transparent manner
  - Malicious site puts up an enticing button for user to click
  - User clicks on what appears to be button, but button in transparent frame clicked instead



Axx: Clickjacking prevention

- **HTTP header X-Frame-Options**
  - Sites can tell browsers never to load their content in an `<iframe>`
    - X-Frame-Options: DENY
  - Sites can tell browsers to only allow `<iframe>` from same site
    - X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
  - Sites can tell browsers to only allow `<iframe>` from specific site
    - X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM https://example.com/

Axx: Clickjacking prevention

- **Initial approach**
  - HTTP header X-Frame-Options:
  - Note: ‘X’ means experimental and temporary
  - Sites can tell browsers never to load their content in an `<iframe>`
    - X-Frame-Options: DENY
  - Sites can tell browsers to only allow `<iframe>` from same site
    - X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
  - Sites can tell browsers to only allow `<iframe>` from specific site
    - X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM https://example.com/
- **Current approach**
  - Content-Security-Policy header
    - `frame-ancestors` directive

Labs and homework

- **See previous handout**

Questions

- https://sayat.me/wu4f

Clickjacking example

```
mashimaro <~>  8:52PM % telnet google.com 80
Trying 2607:f8b0:400a:800::200e...
Connected to google.com.
Escape character is '^]'.
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: google.com

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: http://www.google.com/
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Date: Mon, 06 Nov 2017 04:52:22 GMT
Expires: Wed, 06 Dec 2017 04:52:22 GMT
Cache-Control: public, max-age=2592000
Server: gws
Content-Length: 219
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

<HTML><HEAD><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8">
<TITLE>301 Moved</TITLE></HEAD><BODY>
<H1>301 Moved</H1>
The document has moved
<A HREF="http://www.google.com/">here</A>.
</BODY></HTML>
```